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PRE-TRIAL LITIGATION: DISCOVERY 
  
Summary 
 
The Court determined whether NRS 50.1252 applies to depositions. 
 
Disposition 
 
In Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev. __, __, 319 P.3d 618, 
623 (2014), the Supreme Court concluded that "when invoked at a hearing,…NRS 50.125 
requires disclosure of any document used to refresh the witness's recollection before or while 
testifying, regardless of privilege."  Here, the Court concluded that this interpretation of NRS 
50.125 applies not only to in-court hearings, but also to depositions.    
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
While conducting discovery, KB Home took the deposition of George Holman. Prior to 
his deposition, Holman testified that he had reviewed two memoranda prepared by his attorneys, 
as well as his own handwritten notes, in order to refresh his memory. These memoranda, along 
with Holman’s notes, summarized conversations between Holman and his attorneys. KB Home 
then moved for production of the documents, but Holman refused based on the attorney-client 
privilege and the work-product doctrine. 
On the second day of the deposition, KB Home again asked about the contents of the 
documents and the purpose of reviewing them. Holman again responded that he reviewed the 
documents to refresh his memory. However, Holman refused to divulge the contents of the 
documents based on privilege. 
KB Home filed a motion to compel production of the documents based on NRS 50.125, 
arguing that this provision applied to depositions as well as in-court hearings. The district court 
granted the motion, but KB Home filed a motion for reconsideration. This was referred to the 
discovery commissioner, who recommended full production of all documentation. The district 
court affirmed this recommendation and order production of the full unredacted version of the 
documentation. 
The proceedings were stayed by the district court while LVDA sought writ relief from the 
Nevada Supreme Court. LVDA argued that KB Home (1) did not lay a sufficient foundation to 
invoke NRS 50.125, (2) NRS 50.125 does not serve as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, 
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  NRS 50.125(1) provides:  
If a witness uses a writing to refresh his or her memory, either before or while testifying, an adverse party 
is entitled:  
(a) To have it produced at the hearing;  
(b) To inspect it;  
(c) To cross-examine the witness thereon; and  
(d) To introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness for the 
purpose of affecting the witness's credibility.  
 
and (3) NRS 50.125 does not serve as a waiver of the work-product doctrine 
 
Discussion 
 
 The court noted that it was within their discretion to consider the writ petition because a 
writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to correct an order that compels disclosure of 
privileged information. 
 
Standard of Review  
 
 The court noted that the parties dispute the interpretation of NRS 50.125. Furthermore, 
statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review. When a statute’s language is clear, the court 
will apply it. However, when the language is ambiguous, the court will look to legislative 
history. 
 
KB Home laid a proper foundation to invoke NRS 50.125 
 
 LVDA argued that KB Home could not lay the proper foundation for invoking NRS 
50.125 because KB Home did not establish the extent to which the documents were used to 
refresh Holman’s memory. LVDA pointed to Sipsas v. State, a case in which the Nevada 
Supreme Court held that a photograph was improperly admitted because it was not used to 
refresh a witness’s memory.3 However, the court found that KB Home laid the proper foundation 
by asking Holman why he reviewed the memoranda and what impact the memoranda had on his 
memory.  
 
NRS 50.125 serves as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine 
when a witness reviews such writings to refresh his or her recollection prior to testifying  
 
 LVDA also argued that the attorney client privilege and the work-product doctrine 
superseded NRS 50.125. LVDA relied on NRS 47.020(2), which states that the attorney client 
privilege and the work-product doctrine apply “at all stages of the proceedings.”4 However, the 
Court disagreed by referencing the recent case of Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial 
District Court.5  In Las Vegas Sands Corp., the court analyzed NRS 50.125 and held that 
“Nevada district courts lack discretion to halt the disclosure of privileged documents when a 
witness uses the privileged documents to refresh his or her recollection prior to testifying.”6 
However, the court noted that the application of the term “hearing” to depositions was unclear 
and first addressed whether NRS 50.125 applied to depositions as well as in-court hearings. 
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NRS 50.125’s “hearing” language applied to depositions as well as to in-court hearings. 
 
 The court noted that the definition of the terms “hearing” and “deposition” overlapped in 
that both are official gatherings at which evidence is taken. Accordingly, the court looked to the 
legislative history behind NRS 50.125 but found that there was no discussion as to whether the 
Nevada Legislature intended depositions to be included within the term “hearing”.7  Federal 
courts interpreting FRE 612 have concluded that the rule applies to depositions and deposition 
testimony by operation of FRCP 30(c), which provides that "examination and cross-examination 
of a deponent proceeds as they would at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence."8 Because 
courts have interpreted Rule 612 to apply to depositions and deposition testimony, the court held 
that “NRS 50.125 applies to depositions and deposition testimony as well as to in-court hearings 
by operation of NRCP 30(c).” Given that depositions proceed as permitted at trial, the Court 
could “see no reason why writings used to refresh the memory of a witness before or during a 
deposition should be treated differently than those used by a witness before or at ‘the trial.’” 
 
Conclusion 
 
Reviewing a document for the purposes of refreshing one’s memory allows an adverse 
party to admit the document into evidence, even if the review takes place in the context of a 
deposition. In this case, “KB Home is entitled to know the contents of those memoranda in order 
to properly cross-examine Holman as to their accuracy, truthfulness, and their influence on his 
testimony.”  
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